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DeYoung is clearly master of her material, combining clarity, solid schol-
arship, and much wisdom, though she wears it lightly, befitting one who 
has learned from what she has written. She has succeeded at a difficult 
task; to write a book that is accessible to intelligent lay readers, as well as 
offering fresh perspectives for those widely read in the virtue tradition. As 
Aristotle wrote in the Nicomachean Ethics, “Our present discussion does not 
aim, as our others do, at study; for the purpose of our examination is not 
to know what virtue is, but to become good, since otherwise the inquiry 
would be of no benefit to us” (Book II, Chapter 2, 30; Irwin translation, 
Hackett, 1999). DeYoung’s Vainglory is rich is theoretical insight, but never 
loses sight of virtue’s ultimate purpose for Christians: to become good.
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Anger and Forgiveness: Resentment, Generosity, Justice , by Martha Nuss-
baum. Oxford University Press, 2016. Pp. xii + 315. $24.95 (hardcover).
GLEN PETTIGROVE, University of Auckland
The overarching aim of an academic publication is to contribute to an on-
going conversation in a way that advances the discussion, moving it to-
ward a better understanding of the subject in question. Measured against 
this standard, Nussbaum’s Anger and Forgiveness is a success. It is thought-
ful, articulate, and built on decades of research in ancient philosophy and 
theories of emotion. It will be especially welcome for undergraduates and 
those outside academia who are thinking philosophically about anger or 
forgiveness for the first time. The book is sprinkled with engaging stories 
drawn from literature, history, and personal life that illustrate the argu-
ments she develops and will provide students numerous opportunities to 
see how her theme connects with their daily lives.
However, those already familiar with the philosophical, psychological, 
or theological literature on anger or forgiveness will find the book less 
rewarding. It has the drawbacks associated with being a latecomer to a 
conversation who has not heard most of what has gone before. Or perhaps 
it would be more accurate to say it has the qualities of a work by someone 
who made important contributions to the conversation at some time in 
the past but then wandered into the next room for a while and hasn’t been 
brought up to speed on what was said in her absence.
Building on the cognitive theory of the emotions that she defended 
in Upheavals of Thought (Cambridge University Press, 2001), Nussbaum 
presents an account of anger that focuses on the beliefs and appraisals 
involved in being angry. This is not to say that anger is wholly constituted 
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by its cognitive content. It also involves bodily changes and (often) subjec-
tive feelings (16, 251–253). But she is primarily interested in anger’s cogni-
tive content. She argues that anger is defined by the belief that something 
within one’s circle of concern has been wrongfully harmed and the desire 
to strike back at the agent one takes to be responsible for the harm (18, 
22). To this extent, the account is consistent with her earlier discussions 
of anger (see The Therapy of Desire [Princeton University Press, 1994], 414–
415). The striking shift in Anger and Forgiveness has to do with Nussbaum’s 
position on the normative status of anger. Whereas previously she argued, 
“Anger is a reasonable type of emotion to have,” (Hiding from Humanity 
[Princeton University Press, 2004], 13–14)—indeed, an emotion that in 
many circumstances a clear-eyed, self-respecting person ought to have—
now she contends that “anger is always normatively problematic” (5).
We ought not be angry, she argues, because anger is built on false be-
liefs, objectionable concerns, or both. The desire to lash out at the wrong-
doer, which she calls “the road of payback,” involves “magical thinking.” 
It would make sense if there were a cosmic balance that could be put to 
rights through the suffering of the wrongdoer or if his suffering would 
repair the damage inflicted on the one harmed. But there is no cosmic 
balance and the perpetrator’s suffering seldom removes or repairs the 
victim’s suffering (24). The notable exception is if what the victim suffers 
as a result of the wrong is a reduction in her relative status. Through his 
wrongdoing the perpetrator may appear stronger and more important 
while the victim appears weaker and less important. Retaliating can re-
verse this impression, elevating the status of the former victim relative to 
that of the former perpetrator. Conceived in this way, which Nussbaum 
calls the “road of status,” anger is strategically rational. Nevertheless, it 
remains normatively objectionable: “[T]he tendency to see everything 
that happens as about oneself and one’s own rank seems very narcissistic, 
and ill suited to a society in which reciprocity and justice are important 
values” (28). Alternatively, one could give up anger and instead adopt 
an attitude oriented toward “personal and social welfare,” which is both 
more rational and less objectionable than either the road of payback or the 
road of status (31). She calls the move to this third perspective “the Transi-
tion” from anger to something more productive.
Much of the aim of the book is to encourage the reader to eschew 
backward-looking anger and make the transition to a healthier, forward- 
looking attitude. Given the book’s title, one might expect Nussbaum to 
argue that the ideal way to do this would be to forgive the wrongdoer. 
However, on Nussbaum’s analysis forgiveness has problems of its own. 
Tracing the concept of forgiveness back to early Jewish and Christian 
sources, Nussbaum identifies two conceptions which she calls “trans-
actional” and “unconditional” forgiveness. In transactional forgiveness 
the wrongdoer makes himself eligible for forgiveness by coming to the 
wronged party, regretfully acknowledging his fault, committing himself 
to not repeating this transgression, making restitution, and asking for 
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forgiveness. He may also need to express “a sense of [his] lowness and 
essential worthlessness.” Only then does the victim decide to “forego 
anger” and “become more favorably inclined toward him” (63, 73). In un-
conditional forgiveness, by contrast, the victim decides to forego anger 
without requiring the wrongdoer to be penitent first. The shortcoming of 
transactional forgiveness, Nussbaum argues, is that it shares one or both of 
the faulty assumptions of anger, namely, that the cosmic balance can be re-
stored through the suffering of the perpetrator or that what really matters 
is the victim’s and perpetrator’s relative status (which is set to rights as 
the perpetrator lowers himself in rituals of repentance and elevates his 
former victim by requesting her forgiveness). Unconditional forgiveness 
is likewise problematic insofar as it presupposes that the victim was angry 
to begin with—which is already to get off on the wrong foot—and it “re-
mains backward-looking and not Transitional. It says nothing about con-
structing a productive future” (76). It also “often retains a whiff of moral 
superiority” (141).
Nussbaum’s preferred alternatives are what she calls “Transition-
Anger,” gentleness, disappointment or grief, a love that silences anger 
(in intimate relationships), and a well-anchored commitment to impartial 
justice and public welfare (in political and institutional contexts) (84–85, 
173). Transition-Anger is different from anger-proper insofar as it lacks 
the desire to return hurt for hurt. “[W]hile it acknowledges the wrong, 
it then moves forward. Its entire cognitive content is, ‘How outrageous. 
That should not happen again’” (93). The gentle person is “not vengeful,” 
but is “typically undisturbed” by others’ transgressions—especially in 
the realm of relationships with “strangers, business associates, employers 
and employees, casual acquaintances” and other non-intimates—and is 
“inclined to sympathetic understanding” (53, 138). When someone causes 
serious harm to something within her circle of concern she may respond 
with grief (105). But grief, like gentleness and transition-anger, does not 
channel one’s own suffering into a desire to inflict suffering on another. 
And like them it is consistent with an unwaveringly loving and generous 
orientation.
There is much to like in Anger and Forgiveness, including the attention 
Nussbaum draws to the contribution that feelings of helplessness make 
toward our propensity to become angry. This is a dimension of anger that 
has not been adequately appreciated in the philosophical literature on 
anger and forgiveness. However, there are also a number of places where 
readers might resist Nussbaum’s analysis of anger and forgiveness and 
the role they should play in personal and political life.
The principal difficulty for Nussbaum’s argument against anger is that 
it seems to depend upon a false alternative: Either one is (exclusively) 
interested in payback, or one is (exclusively) interested in status, or one 
is (exclusively) interested in future welfare. But nothing in the argument 
rules out the possibility that the angry person might be interested in all 
three. The fact that one is interested in one’s own status does not entail 
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that one is only interested in status or that one thinks one’s status is the 
most important thing at stake whenever something one cares about has 
been wrongfully harmed. So it is not clear that what she calls the road of 
status—an anger that is rooted in one’s concern for one’s standing vis-a-
vis the wrongdoer—invariably leads to narcissism. Nor need the desire to 
pay back the perpetrator be built on the belief that doing so will balance 
the cosmic scales or mend the harm one has already suffered. Indeed, it 
is not clear that the desire need be explained in terms of any belief at all 
(aside from the belief that someone or something that matters has been 
wrongfully harmed). It may be that the rationality of the desire (and of 
the emotion more generally) is explained by a property possessed by the 
desiderative (or emotional) propensity as a whole rather than by every 
instance of the desire (or emotion). Anger’s desire to strike back may be a 
quick and efficient way to signal one’s opposition to being treated in this 
way, it may motivate one to risk confrontation, and it may deter those 
who might be tempted to encroach on one’s sphere of concern. Nussbaum 
argues that the morally mature can cultivate better ways of achieving 
these ends, and I agree. But nothing in her argument shows that anger 
might not be the most effective means available to the less mature to 
achieve these ends. And if that is the case, then the retaliatory impulse of 
anger may be justified by the effectiveness of the practice as a whole when 
compared to the effectiveness of any other response system available to 
the less morally mature.
The argument against taking forgiveness to be a virtue is similarly 
problematic. It fails to engage with most of those who argue that forgive-
ness is a virtue. Since their views differ from those of the historic accounts 
she criticizes, and since she has done nothing to show that the problems 
with the historic accounts persist in the accounts of Downie, Roberts, 
Garrard and McNaughton, Holmgren, Murphy, and others, she has not 
yet provided any of them with a reason to prefer her position to theirs 
(Robin Downie, “Forgiveness,” Philosophical Quarterly 15 [1965]; Robert 
Roberts, “Forgivingness,” American Philosophical Quarterly 32 [1995]; Eve 
Garrard and David McNaughton, Forgiveness [Acumen, 2010]; Margaret 
Holmgren, Forgiveness and Retribution [Cambridge University Press, 2012]; 
Jeffrie Murphy, Punishment and the Moral Emotions [Oxford University 
Press, 2012]). The closest she comes are some remarks cautioning against 
calling every good thing the victim does in the wake of a wrongful harm 
“forgiveness” (59). To avoid simply assuming “forgiveness” is a term 
of approbation, she does not turn her hand to the conceptual project of 
mapping the contours of forgiveness and distinguishing it (on conceptual 
grounds) from other emotions, practices, or dispositions with which it is 
often confused (as she does in the case of anger). Rather, she turns to the 
historical project of explicating past conceptions of forgiveness reflected 
in Jewish and Christian religious practices. But, not surprisingly, she finds 
that the historical record is similarly untidy. In addition to practices that fit 
the profiles of what she calls transactional and unconditional forgiveness, 
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she also finds a strand that does not emphasize a penitential transaction or 
the effortful overcoming of prior anger. Rather, it is focused on being gra-
cious, generous, or loving. In spite of the fact that this strand has been as-
sociated with forgiveness for centuries, she dismisses it as not really being 
about forgiveness. Instead, she suggests, it is about generosity. For this 
move to be persuasive, one would need to show that being gracious and 
being forgiving are neither a) overlapping concepts nor b) intertwined ac-
tivities. And since treating them as overlapping and intertwined is both a 
longstanding part of the Christian tradition and well represented in the 
current philosophical literature, such a case would require rather exten-
sive development—which Nussbaum fails to give it.
Since the arguments of the book’s later chapters depend upon the 
accounts of forgiveness and anger offered in the opening chapters, the 
abovementioned concerns leave two sizeable holes in the foundation of 
the book’s central argument. For all I have said, it might well be possible 
to fill them, but as of yet, Nussbaum has not shown how it might be done.
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In Defense of Conciliar Christology: A Philosophical Essay , by Timothy Pawl. 
Oxford Studies in Analytic Theology. Oxford University Press, 2016. Pp. 
272. £65.00.
ANDREW TER ERN LOKE, University of Hong Kong
Can a person possess a divine nature and a human nature, given that in-
consistent predicates are true of both? This is the “Fundamental Problem” 
addressed by Pawl as he attempts to defend the philosophical coherence 
of the Christology put forward by the first seven ecumenical councils of 
Christendom. He limits the scope of his book to considering objections 
that are philosophical in nature, stating that he will not consider objec-
tions to Conciliar Christology from Biblical exegesis or from purely his-
torical grounds (5).
After meticulously going through the contents of Conciliar Christology 
in chapter 1, Pawl lays out six necessary conditions for a viable meta physical 
model of the incarnation given Conciliar Christology (48–50). Pawl goes on 
to flesh out a metaphysical model, providing a helpful diagram (62) and 
summary (64), and making a number of helpful clarifications such as why 
a concrete (rather than abstract) view of natures should be preferred and 
why the term “predication” should be preferred to “properties” (77–78).
From chapter 4 onwards Pawl provides a detailed explication of the 
Fundamental Problem, comprehensively listing ten possible responses 
